Russian GPS-Spoofing Infrastructure in Kaliningrad Expands 12X; 450km Radius Now Covers Seven States

Darius Kuliešius, deputy head of the RRT, told Reuters the dataset is derived from analysis of ADS-B aviation surveillance signals, which is how civilian observers reliably reconstruct the spoofing footprint without access to military intelligence. The 450-kilometre radius covers Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, Sweden, Belarus and the Baltic Sea. Specific civilian impacts include degraded mobile network quality near Kaliningrad and the failure of GPS-dependent online bus schedules in Klaipėda during interference surges.

Public flight incidents include the diversion of Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles's aircraft in 2025 and disruption to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's plane. The Lithuanian parliament was sheltered under an air-danger warning on 20 May 2026 — the first such activation. Interference patterns spike during Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, which suggests operational rather than purely political tasking.

A twelvefold infrastructure expansion in fifteen months is not maintenance; it is build-out. The civilian GNSS-dependent layer across the Baltic states and northern Poland — aviation, mobile networks, public transport — now operates under regular interference as baseline rather than incident. This is the operational reality into which the German–Netherlands Corps assignment to Latvia and Estonia, announced the same week, will reinforce — an extension of the UK Defence Ministry framing first set out in Signal No. 64.